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TRANSPARENCY AND POLICYMAKING AT THE 
SUPREME COURT 
Louis J. Virelli III* 
INTRODUCTION 
I would like to thank the Georgia State University Law Review for 
including me in this symposium on transparency at the Supreme 
Court and for providing me the opportunity to respond to Professor 
Eric Segall’s characteristically insightful and thought-provoking 
article on the topic. I share many of Professor Segall’s concerns 
about the transparency of our public institutions, including the Court. 
I also agree that some of the Court’s practices, particularly with 
regard to the Justices’ papers and cameras in the courtroom, could 
benefit from greater transparency in light of the Court’s role in our 
constitutional democracy. 
I begin to depart from Professor Segall’s position, however, when 
it comes to the Court’s certiorari and recusal practices. This is not 
because I think transparency is necessarily a bad idea in either 
context, but rather because I think the Court’s duties in each of these 
areas go beyond its traditional judicial role into what I will 
(somewhat clumsily) call policymaking responsibilities. The process 
of policymaking, at least as I intend to use the term, involves 
discretionary value judgments that are not typically seen as a core 
feature of judging. Judges are fundamentally expected to be neutral 
arbiters of legal disputes; they apply the facts of individual cases to 
legal rules to arrive at legal conclusions.1 Of course, even core 
judicial processes involve normative questions and judgments. This 
is especially true with regard to the Supreme Court, which is not only 
                                                                                                                 
 *    Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. In addition to thanking the Law Review for 
including me in their symposium on transparency at the Supreme Court, I want to especially thank Luke 
Donohue and Christine Lee for their excellent work in making the symposium, and this issue, possible. 
 1. In fact, this assumption lies at the heart of most conversations about judicial recusal, including 
recusal at the Supreme Court. Professor Segall cites the prospect of someone being a judge in his or her 
own case as support for the need for judicial recusal and, in turn, for transparency in the recusal process. 
See Eric J. Segall, Invisible Justices: How Our Highest Court Hides from the American People, 32 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 787, 797–810 (2016). 
1
Virelli: Transparency and Policymaking
Published by Reading Room, 2016
904 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:4 
our court of last resort, but also the institution that is tasked with 
answering some of our most divisive and complex national questions. 
Nevertheless, I contend that there is a difference between the 
Supreme Court’s typical judicial role, represented in its resolution of 
cases through the public issuance of legally binding judgments and 
opinions, and the far less common, but very real, exercises of 
discretionary authority it is required to make as part of its broader 
institutional mission. Those discretionary decisions incorporate more 
open-ended considerations of the Court’s role in our tripartite 
government. Such considerations include the public welfare and 
opinion that are neither as universally accepted in, nor as closely 
constrained by positive law, as traditional judging. In short, the 
Justices sometimes must exercise, in the words of Chief Justice John 
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, a form of “constitutional or legal 
discretion” that likens them more to the political branches than the 
courts.2 
But where does this discretionary authority come from? Since we 
do not normally think of judges as explicitly making policy, it makes 
sense to first ask whether the Court is in fact permitted to exercise 
discretion in its certiorari and recusal decisions, and second, whether 
broad discretion is justified in each of those areas. I suggest that the 
answer to both of these is an unqualified yes, albeit for slightly 
different reasons. The Justices’ discretionary power over its certiorari 
decisions has been delegated by Congress, and as such is justified by 
its legislative pedigree.3 Discretion over recusal decisions is, I argue 
both here and elsewhere, committed exclusively to the Justices by the 
text, history, and structure of the Constitution—more specifically by 
Article III’s vesting of the “judicial Power of the United States” 
exclusively in the courts.4 That is not to say that either decision is 
wholly unbounded. Congress could exercise its power over the 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction to more closely control its docket, and 
there are constitutional limits—like the Due Process Clause—on the 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803). 
 3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257 (2012). 
 4. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; See also LOUIS J. VIRELLI III, DISQUALIFYING THE HIGH COURT: 
SUPREME COURT RECUSAL AND THE CONSTITUTION 46-94 (Forthcoming 2016). 
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Justices’ recusal practices.5 These limits only highlight the fact, 
however, that there is a range of choices in each context that is not 
just left to the Court’s discretion, but that is committed to its 
discretion as a matter of law. 
So what does the fact that the Court is sometimes asked to make 
discretionary “policy” judgments have to do with transparency? The 
answer may ultimately be nothing—it is entirely possible that 
transparency is equally well-justified in every aspect of the Court’s 
existence. The Court is, after all, a public institution entrusted with 
vast power and responsibility. It seems potentially inconsistent with 
the concept of democratic government to have important decisions 
made in relative secret, with little or no accountability. This is all 
true. It does not, however, account for the fact that many of our 
governmental institutions often make—or at least contemplate—
important policy decisions in secret. Congress, our primary 
policymaking institution, is constitutionally required to “keep [and 
publish] a [j]ournal of its [p]roceedings,” but only to the extent the 
Congress determines that the proceedings do not “require [s]ecrecy.”6 
Even a roll call vote is only constitutionally required to be reported 
when “one fifth of those [p]resent” desire it.7 Executive officials, 
including administrative agencies that have been delegated express 
policymaking authority by Congress, have long been protected from 
disclosing their deliberations over certain policy questions to the 
public, even in the face of formal requests for that information.8 The 
most common rationale given for executive secrecy is the need to 
protect agency deliberations in order to “encourage open, frank 
discussions on matters of policy” and to “protect against premature 
disclosure of proposed policies . . . and . . . public confusion that 
                                                                                                                 
 5. VIRELLI , supra note 4, at 120–64. 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. 
 7. Id. 
 8. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2012). The primary legal vehicle for public disclosure of government 
materials, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), contains an exception for materials that would be 
considered privileged in the context of civil litigation, including the deliberative process privilege. Id.; 
United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792, 800 (1984); Burka v. HHS, 87 F.3d 508, 516 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996) (explaining that FOIA “incorporates . . . generally recognized civil discovery protections”). 
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might result from disclosure of reasons and rationales that were not 
in fact ultimately the grounds for an agency’s action.”9 
The question, then, is whether the same rationales that permit 
secrecy in the legislative and executive branches’ policymaking 
processes apply to the members of the judiciary when they too are 
tasked with making policy decisions. The Justices make such 
determinations when they decide whether to grant certiorari or to 
recuse themselves from cases properly before the Court. The 
remainder of this essay will explore how the discretionary nature of 
certiorari and recusal decisions impact the arguments for 
transparency in both contexts. 
I.   CERTIORARI 
The Supreme Court currently enjoys virtually unlimited discretion 
over its own appellate docket.10 It exercises this discretion through its 
decisions to grant or deny petitions for writs of certiorari.11 Congress 
first granted the Court the power to refuse cases on appeal at the end 
of the nineteenth century.12 By that point, the Court had fallen several 
years behind on its existing docket. It implored Congress to provide 
some relief by authorizing the Justices to reject cases that it did not 
think merited their attention.13 Congress obliged, but the problem of 
                                                                                                                 
 9. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, EXEMPTION 5, at 13 
(2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/exemption5.pdf [hereinafter 
DOJ GUIDE]. 
 10. The Court has less discretion over whether to exercise its original jurisdiction over cases 
“affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a 
Party.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. See also Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972) 
(explaining that the Court’s original jurisdiction should be invoked “sparingly,” but that it nonetheless is 
“obligatory . . . in appropriate cases” (quoting Utah v. United States, 394 U.S. 89, 95 (1969))). 
 11. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012). Direct appeal to the Supreme Court is available from decisions in civil 
cases by three-judge district courts. Id. 
 12. Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential 
Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 392 (2004) (noting that the 
“Court found itself unable to cope with its workload and fell more than three years behind in processing 
cases.”). 
 13. This decision was made easier by Congress’s creation of the lower federal appellate courts 
around the same time, thereby offering litigants a more robust opportunity to appeal federal trial court 
decisions without infringing on the resources of the Supreme Court or its justices. Establishment of the 
U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 26 Stat. 826 (1891), http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark 
_12_txt.html. Prior to that time, the federal appeals were still being heard by panels of judges consisting 
4
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an overloaded docket persisted.14 Congress responded with the 
Judiciary Act of 1925, which conferred on the Justices “broad 
discretion to decline to review the vast majority of the cases” 
presented to it.15 The 1925 Act did not, however, eliminate all forms 
of mandatory appellate review for the Court,16 and the Justices 
continued to push back against those mandatory appeals. The Court 
often treated mandatory appellate cases in the same summary fashion 
as petitions for certiorari. The result was the erosion of the 
“discretionary-mandatory distinction between certiorari and appeal” 
and a further practical expansion of the Court’s control over its 
docket.17 This combination of judicial pressure and practical effect 
led Congress to effectively remove all statutory impediments to the 
Court’s discretionary authority over its appellate docket in 1988.18 
Since that time, the Court has exercised nearly unfettered control 
over its caseload, especially its appellate cases. 
Congress has never required the Justices to explain their decisions 
or even to set standards to guide those decisions. The Justices have 
articulated their own set of considerations for granting certiorari, but 
have also made clear that those considerations are “neither 
controlling nor fully measuring the Court’s discretion.”19 The Court 
                                                                                                                 
of local federal trial court judges and Supreme Court justices “riding circuit”—travelling around the 
country to sit as judges in federal appeals. See Judiciary Act of 1802, 2 Stat. 156 (1802), 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_04_txt.html. 
 14. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 12, at 392 (explaining that Congress responded to the Court’s 
overtures with the Evarts Act, “which created the intermediate courts of appeals and for the first time 
explicitly conferred on the Supreme Court some authority—through an order denying a writ of 
certiorari—simply to turn away cases that were not judged to warrant full consideration and resolution 
on their merits”). 
 15. Id. 
 16. The Act still required the Court to hear appeals in a subset of cases, including cases in which a 
state supreme court declared a federal statute unconstitutional or denied a constitutional challenge to a 
state statute. The 1925 Act also required the Court to decide cases that were certified to them by federal 
appellate courts. See Section 240(a) of the Judiciary Act of 1925, http://www.fjc.gov/history/ 
home.nsf/page/landmark_15_txt.html; History of the Federal Judiciary: Landmark Judicial Legislation, 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_15.html (last visited 
June 2, 2016). 
 17. Federal Judicial Center, Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, 57 
F.R.D. 573, 595–96 (1972). 
 18. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 12, at 394 (citing Review of Cases by the Supreme Court, Pub. 
L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (1988)). 
 19. SUP. CT. R. 10. 
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is thus left, as a matter of law and practice, with the authority to 
decide for itself if a case merits review. 
This fact alone, however, does not say much about whether the 
Justices should have to take the next step of justifying why they 
exercised their discretion in a particular way. It is one thing to grant a 
government decision maker wide latitude in reaching its conclusion. 
It is quite another to allow them to do so without any public 
explanation. The latter point requires some additional understanding 
of why judicial discretion is important in the certiorari context. 
The predominant reason for granting the Court so much control 
over its docket was concern about its caseload. Prior to the Act of 
1925, the Court was as much as three years behind in its disposition 
of cases. In a world where cases routinely take years just to get to the 
certiorari stage, it is at least fair to acknowledge that an additional 
three years of waiting for a decision from the Justices would be 
problematic for the Court’s reputation and effectiveness. This is 
particularly important because the Court’s democratic legitimacy—
its ability to garner public acceptance of its decisions—depends so 
heavily on public perception.20 Once we recognize that the size of the 
Court’s docket is a significant factor in its ability to fulfill its 
constitutional responsibilities, we can see why broad discretion over 
which cases it hears—and whether it should explain its exercise of 
that discretion—is so important. 
Assume that the maximum number of cases the Court can 
competently hear and decide in a given term is 150.21 Now assume 
that there are 200 cases in a given term that present important issues 
of federal law to the Court. These cases may be “circuit splits,” in 
which different federal circuits have reached opposite conclusions on 
                                                                                                                 
 20. As Alexander Hamilton explained, the Court is the weakest branch of government because it 
possesses “neither force nor will but merely judgment.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
It therefore depends on its ability to persuade for its authority. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865–66 (1992) (“[T]he Court’s legitimacy depends on making 
legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their principled character is sufficiently 
plausible to be accepted by the Nation.”). 
 21. This is a conservative estimate. The Court’s current docket is roughly half that amount. 
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (May 29, 2016), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/faq.aspx#faqgi9. 
6
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 3
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol32/iss4/3
2016] TRANSPARENCY AND POLICYMAKING 909 
the same matter of federal law, cases in which a lower court 
invalidated a federal statute on constitutional grounds, or cases that 
directly conflict with controlling Court precedent. By the Justices’ 
own admission, each of these categories of cases is, at least 
theoretically, worthy of Supreme Court review.22 Yet for solely 
administrative reasons, one-fourth (50) of them must either be denied 
certiorari or held over for decision in another term, thereby pushing 
back worthy cases from the next term in a potentially endless cycle of 
docket congestion and delay. If there is some quantitative limit on the 
Court’s capacity to accept cases—and under the constitutional 
requirement of a single, undivided Court there most certainly is23—
then the Justices will likely be forced to turn away cases that would 
otherwise, time and resources permitting, merit its consideration. Put 
another way, it is easy to imagine an environment where the Court’s 
actual decisions to grant some cases and deny others is at best a 
matter of taste and at worst arbitrary. Regardless of who is 
responsible for the line drawing between worthy cases, a requirement 
that the decision makers (in this case, the Justices) try to explain such 
decisions in a way that provides the public with understandable and 
useful insight into the working of government seems like a noble, but 
ultimately doomed, exercise. 
It of course would not be impossible for the Court to simply 
explain that administrative limitations forced it to make exceedingly 
difficult choices, but it is hard to imagine the benefit of such an 
explanation outweighing its potential costs. For example, we 
generally expect our public figures, especially our judges, to be 
consistent in their decision making—to treat like cases alike. But the 
quantitative limitations on certiorari decisions make that consistency 
                                                                                                                 
 22. See SUP. CT. R. 10. 
 23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Article III explicitly requires that there be “one supreme Court.” Id.; 
The overwhelming consensus in the scholarly literature and in constitutional practice is that the Court 
must act as a single unitary body, rather than, for instance, in smaller panels of justices. See, e.g., Louis 
J. Virelli III, The (Un)Constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal Standards, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 1181, 
1220–22 (2011) [hereinafter Virelli, The (Un)Constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal Standards]. 
But see Lisa T. McElroy & Michael C. Dorf, Coming Off the Bench: Legal and Policy Implications of 
Proposals to Allow Retired Justices to Sit by Designation on the Supreme Court, 61 DUKE L.J. 81, 99–
100 (2011). 
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near impossible. A case that may be granted review in one year may 
simply not be able to be fit into the Court’s schedule the next. It is 
easy to envision public sentiment turning against the Court when it 
rejects an important case due primarily to concerns about docket 
congestion. This is particularly true because the Court makes 
certiorari decisions on a case-by-case basis. Even the most rational of 
observers may struggle to accept the immediate loss of their own 
preferred case for administrative reasons in favor of one they find 
less worthy of review. Broader public sentiment is also more likely to 
be moved by immediacy concerns than by the deferred gratification 
of a timely and efficient justice system. As Justice Brennan explained 
in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, there is an 
inherent danger in “pit[ting] an interest the benefits of which are 
immediate, concrete, and easily understood against one, the benefits 
of which are almost entirely prophylactic.”24 The additional tension 
around the Court resulting from the administrative rejection of 
important cases could chip away at the public’s confidence in the 
institution in a way that is potentially delegitimizing. 
Moreover, different Justices may perceive the Court’s 
administrative capacity and the relative value of cases or legal 
doctrines differently. This creates two related, but ultimately distinct, 
problems. First, in cases where administrative concerns are not 
unanimous, certiorari decisions could be (rightly or not) perceived as 
substantive judgments about the significance of particular cases. 
Regardless of whether the Justices’ decisions are purely 
administrative, the reality of administrative constraints on the Court 
makes it exceedingly difficult (if not impossible) to separate the 
substantive from the procedural. This is especially true when 
certiorari decisions are split among the Justices. One response to this 
could be that requiring every Justice to explain their decision in every 
vote would allow a watchful public to evaluate each Justice’s 
certiorari decisions over time and gain valuable insight into the true 
motivations and criteria informing their votes. If this were true, it 
could provide a powerful argument in favor of transparency in the 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 863 (1986). 
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certiorari process. In reality, however, requiring the Justices to 
explain all of their certiorari votes just compounds an already serious 
problem of time and resource scarcity on the Court. The Justices’ 
explanations could take up a tremendous amount of the Court’s time 
and energy, resulting (ironically) in even fewer cases being eligible 
for review. Forcing Justices to go on the record in their certiorari 
decisions also creates a body of individual precedent that will, if done 
effectively, require Justices to make more and more nuanced 
arguments in future cases in order to preserve the illusion of 
consistency in a decision-making regime that is realistically destined 
to be inconsistent. The more likely result would be a glut of cursory 
statements about the resource and time constraints facing the 
Justices.25 
Second, requiring a Justice to explain their certiorari vote when 
that vote was not part of a prevailing coalition could be perceived as 
a conflict among the Justices over the value or importance of a 
particular legal issue prior to the Court actually reaching a conclusion 
on the topic. For example, six Justices may vote against hearing a 
case on administrative grounds. A dissenting Justice’s explanation 
that they voted to hear the case because of its substantive importance 
could give the false impression that either the other Justices do not 
think the case is substantively important, that their administrative 
justification was a pretext, or both, when all that was really at work 
was a disagreement among the Justices over the best use of the 
Court’s docket that term. Prematurely signaling a dispute on the 
Court over the substantive value of a given legal issue could 
incentivize the Justices to rely exclusively on administrative 
rationales for fear of raising issues that have not been fully vetted by 
their colleagues. The resultant chilling effect could have negative 
consequences for the Justices’ deliberations in future cases, thereby 
ossifying, or at least complicating, the certiorari process without 
much corresponding informational benefit to outside observers.26 
                                                                                                                 
 25. See discussion infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 26. One could argue that there is really no difference between a dispute about docket management 
and the substantive importance of a case because the former will depend on the latter, and this may be 
true in some cases. But when the institutional capacity to decide cases in a timely manner (less than 200) 
9
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Both of these difficulties with increased transparency at the 
certiorari stage are consistent with problems addressed in the 
executive policymaking context by the deliberative process privilege. 
Deliberative process protects against the “premature disclosure of 
proposed policies . . . and . . . public confusion that might result from 
disclosure of reasons and rationales that were not in fact ultimately 
the grounds for an agency’s action.”27 Requiring Justices to explain 
their certiorari votes risks forcing them to prematurely divulge 
positions on policy issues before the entire Court has considered 
them. It also threatens either to provide highly misleading 
information about the Justices’ views on particular cases and issues 
or to unfairly raise suspicions about the Justices’ candor when the 
driving force behind a particular outcome is a genuine disagreement 
about the Court’s short-term administrative priorities, rather than a 
conflict over the substantive value of granting review. 
In addition to purely administrative issues with certiorari, there are 
more substantive considerations that may defy explanation and thus 
counsel against transparency. The Court is constitutionally limited to 
deciding “cases” and “controversies,” such that the substantive issues 
raised by individual cases are not the only non-administrative 
considerations in a certiorari decision.28 For an unreviewable body 
like the Supreme Court, the danger of choosing the “wrong” case to 
address a significant legal issue is especially salient. As Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes so aptly put it, “[g]reat cases, like hard cases, 
make bad law.”29 Frederick Schauer similarly noted that lawmaking 
through individual cases “may produce inferior law whenever the 
concrete case is nonrepresentative of the full array of events that the 
ensuing rule or principle will encompass.”30 This concern is 
magnified at the Court and, as Justice Holmes indicated over a 
century ago, is not lost on the Justices. Concerns about the factual or 
                                                                                                                 
is so far exceeded by the number of cases annually requesting review (over 7,000), there has to be room 
for purely procedural line drawing in order to preserve the Court’s ability to function. See Frequently 
Asked Questions, supra note 21. 
 27. DOJ GUIDE, supra note 9, at 13. 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 29. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 30. Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 884 (2006). 
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procedural posture of a case may be grounds for the Court to pass on 
that case despite the magnitude of the legal issue it raises. Imagine a 
case that raises an issue of the utmost national interest but presents an 
unusual factual scenario or one the Justices perceive to have been 
decided below on an incomplete factual record. The Court could 
decide to accept the case and remand it for further fact finding, but 
could just as easily decide to deny review and wait for the issue to 
come up again on a more fully developed record.31 The same is true 
for potential procedural problems. Cases raising jurisdictional or 
justiciability issues like standing may make it too difficult for the 
Court to reach the real issue of interest, thus counseling the Justices 
to deny review in that case and wait for one that raises the relevant 
issue more directly.32 Highly sensitive social issues raise similar 
certiorari problems. There are good arguments for the Court to 
refrain from addressing a politically charged issue until the lower 
courts and the political process have had a chance to confront it. This 
is both to promote democratic values and for the simple reason that 
Supreme Court decisions are far more difficult to change than 
solutions from the lower courts or Congress.33 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Similar concerns arose in a recently argued abortion case before the Court. See Dahlia Lithwick, 
The Women Take Over, SLATE (Mar. 2, 2016, 6:20 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/supreme_court_dispatches/2016/03/in_oral_arguments
_for_the_texas_abortion_case_the_three_female_justices.html (describing Justice Kennedy’s comment 
during oral argument as indicating “that it might be ‘proper’ and ‘helpful’ for the court to remand this 
back to the lower courts for hearings” on some perceived deficiencies in the factual record). 
 32. There is a case to be made that this is what happened in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 
(2013), a case that raised the issue of the constitutional right to marriage for same-sex couples but that 
was ultimately decided on standing grounds. 
 33. This has come up recently in the Second Amendment context. Since its landmark decision in 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the Court has denied certiorari in several Second 
Amendment cases, presumably to let the lower courts and the political process deal with the 
ramifications of Heller before the justices weigh in with another unreviewable ruling on the matter. 
Jonathan Adler, Supreme Court Declines to Hear Second Amendment Case over Dissent of Two 
Justices, WASH. POST (June 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/ 
2015/06/09/supreme-court-declines-to-hear-second-amendment-case-over-dissent-of-two-justices/ 
(“Since deciding D.C. v. Heller and McDonald v. Chicago, the Court has shown little interest in 
clarifying the scope of constitutionally protected gun rights.”); Protecting Strong Gun Laws: The 
Supreme Court Leaves Lower Court Victories Untouched, LAW CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE 
(Aug. 26, 2015), http://smartgunlaws.org/protecting-strong-gun-laws-the-supreme-court-leaves-lower-
court-victories-untouched/ (explaining that since 2008, “the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected more than 
sixty cases seeking to expand” Heller). 
11
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Although these may be valid reasons to deny review, they do not 
necessarily mean the Justices should not explain their vote against 
granting certiorari on those grounds. After all, if the Court is 
expected to explain itself in opinions deciding cases on factual or 
procedural grounds, it should be able to do so in the certiorari 
context. The difference between such explanations in merits versus 
certiorari decisions, however, is two-fold. First, in merits cases, the 
Court has presumably decided that the factual or procedural issue 
requires an official resolution. In that case, an explanation is 
important because it is part of the Court’s responsibility to decide 
cases and set binding precedent. At the certiorari stage, the 
explanation does not create any future legal consequences and is thus 
less valuable for that reason alone.34 Second, a merits decision 
addressing factual or procedural issues will almost always garner a 
majority of the Court, thereby diminishing the likelihood of 
confusion about the Court’s message.35 Certiorari votes and, by 
extension, any explanation thereof are individualized. The Court may 
not reach any form of consensus on factual or procedural concerns at 
the certiorari stage. The lack of legal effect and the possibility of 
conflicting messages trigger the same concerns about public 
confusion that underlie deliberative process privilege without an 
obvious countervailing benefit. To the extent certiorari decisions 
reflect the Justices’ policy determinations about which cases to 
review, the arguments for transparency in those determinations fall 
short. 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Individual Justices’ certiorari decisions could create a body of precedent for that Justice. For the 
reasons articulated above, the possibility of individualized precedent in certiorari decisions creates its 
own set of challenges that also argue against transparency. 
 35. In the October 2013 term, a search of the Supreme Court Database revealed that the Court issued 
only three plurality opinions, opinions in which less than a majority of the Court signed onto the 
primary opinion in the case. The October 2014 term included only one. THE SUPREME COURT 
DATABASE, http://supremecourtdatabase.org/index.php (last visited June 2, 2016). This is consistent 
with historical data on plurality opinions. According to James F. Spriggs II and David R. Stras, 
“Historically, plurality decisions by the Supreme Court have been relatively rare: during the 145 Terms 
between 1801 and 1955, the Supreme Court issued only 45 plurality decisions.” James F. Spriggs II and 
David R. Stras, Explaining Plurality Decisions, 99 GEO. L.J. 515, 519 (2011). However, “during the 54 
Terms from 1953 to 2006, the Supreme Court issued 195 plurality opinions, approximately 3.4% of the 
5,711 total cases decided during the period.” Id. 
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There are also serious practical problems with any legislative 
attempt to require transparency in the Court’s certiorari process. 
Because the Court is unreviewable and any violations of legislative 
disclosure standards would be (at least directly) unenforceable, it will 
be difficult to ensure that the Justices reveal any more about their 
certiorari decisions than they would otherwise choose to, which 
currently appears to be almost nothing.36 More likely, in the interest 
of inter-branch comity, the Justices would provide some summary 
explanation such as, “I conclude that the current case is not a good 
candidate for review.” This level of explanation offers little if any 
insight into the process and makes the Court look potentially even 
more obstructionist than it does under the current, more secret 
regime. Relying on historic reasons for not divulging or explaining 
certiorari votes is far easier to defend than offering largely hollow 
explanations in response to a request by a coequal branch of 
government. What’s more, the Justices are free to—and in fact do—
explain their disagreement with the Court’s decision to grant 
certiorari when they feel it is necessary.37 This makes information 
about the process available in at least some circumstances without 
triggering the problems associated with mandatory reporting. 
Taken in connection with previous arguments against the Court 
offering detailed explanations of its certiorari votes, legislative 
transparency requirements seem increasingly difficult to justify. Such 
requirements promise little in the way of valuable insight while 
increasing the likelihood of public confusion about the process and 
potentially casting the Court as unduly obstructionist in its refusal to 
fully comply with an arguably misguided congressional mandate. 
Lastly, some commentators, including Professor Segall, argue that 
simply recording the Justices’ certiorari votes in each case increases 
transparency in a useful way.38 On one hand, a simple record of the 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Congress could always employ its other constitutional tools, such as appropriations or 
investigations, to try and incentivize compliance with certiorari disclosure requirements, but each of 
these methods is at best indirect enforcement mechanisms. See Louis J. Virelli III, Congress, the 
Constitution, and Supreme Court Recusal, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1535, 1587–99 (2012). 
 37. See, e.g., Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 2799 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 38. See Segall supra note 1, at 829. 
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certiorari votes in each case diminishes concerns about public 
confusion and prematurely revealing the Court’s views on policy 
issues because it says little about either. It is hard for observers to be 
confused, the argument goes, if all that is given to them is an 
accounting of how each Justice voted. It likewise does not 
prematurely reveal any Court policy regarding a particular case or 
legal issue because it says almost nothing about it, especially the 
administrative challenges surrounding certiorari. 
The counter argument, however, is even more powerful. Because a 
list of votes cast says nothing about the multiple variables affecting 
that certiorari decision—such as administrative issues, factual or 
procedural problems, and social and cultural attitudes—it is at best 
unhelpful and at worst highly misleading. Taken literally, a vote 
count says nothing about why certiorari was granted or denied in a 
given case. Any more ambitious attempts to gather information from 
such an accounting are inherently misinformed. The result is an 
increased potential for public confusion with no corresponding 
increase in public awareness or insight. 
A vote count is further unsatisfying because it incentivizes the 
Justices to change their approach to voting in order to preserve the 
status quo of secrecy in their deliberations. One obvious way in 
which the Justices could protect themselves against a requirement 
that they divulge their certiorari votes is for the Court to make those 
votes anonymous. Anonymous ballots would strip the vote count of 
most, if not all, of its informational value and would be entirely 
within the Court’s purview, absent a legislative requirement to the 
contrary. To the extent Congress tried to legislatively require the 
Court to publish its votes, it would run into the same problems of 
public confusion and damage to the Court’s reputation already 
discussed. 
There is much intuitive appeal to pulling back the curtain on the 
Court’s certiorari process. The most direct way to do that may be to 
have the members of the Court explain their decisions. What is 
missing from this view, however, is an acknowledgement of the 
nature of the Court’s decision to hear a case. Due both to Congress’s 
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delegation to the Court of control over its own docket and to the 
breadth and interrelatedness of the variables involved in the decision, 
the certiorari process more closely approximates a policymaking 
exercise by the Justices than a more traditional adjudicative one. This 
does not mean that increased transparency in certiorari decisions is 
necessarily a bad idea in all cases. It merely suggests that recasting 
the certiorari process in policymaking terms reveals a new 
perspective on transparency at the Court that implicates additional 
rationales for protecting policy makers from disclosure. Rationales 
include the importance of the deliberative process privilege, which 
have been previously overlooked in this context and that affect our 
broader understanding of certiorari and, as it turns out, recusal at the 
Court. 
II.   RECUSAL 
Recusal is the process by which a judge or Justice is excluded from 
participating in an individual case.39 Unlike the certiorari process, 
recusal is currently regulated directly by Congress in the form of a 
federal recusal statute.40 The statute precludes federal judges, 
including Supreme Court Justices, from participating in a variety of 
cases that may present a conflict of interest that could hinder the 
judge’s impartiality, such as having a personal financial interest in 
the outcome or being related to one of the parties or lawyers in the 
case.41 Recusal is also statutorily required “in any proceeding in 
which [a judge’s] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”42 
Judges and Justices decide their own recusal issues in the first 
instance. Those decisions are generally subject to appellate review, 
                                                                                                                 
 39. “Recusal” is used interchangeably to include both the terms “disqualification,” which 
traditionally refers to involuntary removal of a judge from a case, and “recusal,” which has historically 
referred to a judge’s voluntary decision to withdraw from a case. RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL 
DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 4 (2d ed. 2007). 
 40. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012). 
 41. See id. 
 42. Id. at § 455(a). 
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except for members of the Court, who lack any superior tribunal to 
hear an appeal from their recusal decisions.43 
Based on the clear statutory language, the decision to recuse 
appears a purely legal one. Judges or Justices simply apply the 
statutory provisions to the facts of their case. For lower court judges, 
this is generally true. For Supreme Court Justices, however, I have 
argued that the decision to recuse has constitutional implications that 
render it closer to a policy judgment than a traditional legal 
analysis.44 To summarize, constitutional text, history, and structure 
suggest that a Justice’s decision to recuse is part of the “judicial 
power” granted to the Court under Article III. Any congressional 
attempt to interfere with that decision by setting substantive recusal 
standards must be based in an independent source of congressional 
power under Article I, like the Necessary and Proper Clause.45 Yet 
when viewed as a matter of constitutional structure, we see that 
legislative recusal standards for the Justices run afoul of the Court’s 
inherent power under Article III to decide cases properly before it. To 
the extent a recusal statute threatens to recuse all nine Justices in a 
single case (an outcome that both theoretically and historically is far 
more likely than most realize), the statute interferes with the Court’s 
power to decide that case and thus violates the separation of powers 
and, more specifically, Article III.46 
The constitutional infirmities with Supreme Court recusal 
standards highlight the true nature of recusal at the Court. While the 
Justices have many sources to draw on to inform the ethical analyses 
associated with recusal, they are also obligated to protect their 
constitutional mission by remaining available to resolve disputes, 
even in cases where widespread recusal may be justified. The result 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Lower court judges are also the initial factfinders and adjudicators of their own recusal status, 
subject to traditional appellate review by a higher court under an abuse of discretion standard. FLAMM, 
supra note 39, 5-8, 988. 
 44. See generally VIRELLI, supra note 4. I have argued that similar constitutional issues with recusal 
arise in the lower federal courts and state supreme courts, but those arguments are beyond the scope of 
the present discussion of transparency at the Court. See id. at 165-210. 
 45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 46. See Virelli, The (Un)Constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal Standards, supra note 23, at 
1207–25. 
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is a balance between ethical and institutional concerns that may move 
beyond a traditional legal analysis to resemble something more akin 
to the policy determinations required in certiorari decisions.47 Once 
we recast Supreme Court recusal as, at least in part, a matter of 
judicial discretion, we are able to see the full range of transparency 
concerns that accompany any policy decision, including recusal at the 
Court. 
As with the certiorari process, recusal at the Court is based on a set 
of variables that can be difficult to balance. Any resulting 
explanation of that balance runs the risk of ranging between 
unhelpful and unduly confusing to a lay audience, and may therefore 
trigger the same type of protections found in the deliberative process 
privilege. Even if we assume—as we often do in complicated legal 
analyses—that Justices are capable of explaining difficult decisions 
in a way that the public can accept as legitimate, there are additional 
problems of the potential precedential effect of recusal decisions on 
individual Justices and other members of the Court. Certiorari is a 
policy-based decision that is made by the Court as a whole—
individual Justices contribute to the outcome by voting, but no single 
Justice has the sole ability to set “precedent” for the Court by voting 
to hear or reject a case. Supreme Court recusal, by contrast, is and 
always has been an individual, unreviewable decision by a Justice of 
their own fitness to participate in a given case.48 If required to 
explain themselves in any detail, the individualized nature of the 
decision would put a Justice in the unique position of potentially 
setting a precedent for their colleagues in future cases without any 
input or feedback from the rest of the Court. 
                                                                                                                 
 47. In my previous work on recusal at the Court, I have suggested that the justices’ recusal decisions 
are controlled, at least at the margins, by the Due Process Clause. See VIRELLI, supra note 4, at 120–64. 
But even if we think of due process analyses as traditionally legal, there will still be a wide range of 
recusal issues before the Court that require balancing ethical and constitutional questions yet will not go 
as far as to implicate fundamental issues of due process. The important point at present is that because at 
least a wide range of recusal decisions are committed to the justices as a matter of constitutional law (as 
opposed to statutory law in the certiorari context), similar questions arise about how the nature of the 
Court’s activity affects the need for transparency. 
 48. John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 612 (1947). 
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There are two potentially troubling consequences that arise from 
this reality, both of which counsel against the Justices explaining 
their recusal decisions. One is that it puts a single Justice in a position 
to set what amounts to a policy decision for the entire Court. 
Regardless of how persuasive (or not) the recusal-as-policy argument 
first seems, there is no question that Supreme Court recusal entails 
independent, unreviewable decisions by single Justices that 
necessarily incorporate a wide range of factors about which 
reasonable minds can differ. Requiring Justices to go on the record in 
defense of their recusal decisions puts undue pressure on future 
Justices who may have different—but equally defensible—views as 
to how to balance the institutional and ethical concerns that arise in a 
given case. Moreover, the Justices have consistently shown, in over 
225 years of recusal practice, that they consider recusal an 
independent matter for each Justice, and as such will not do anything 
to unduly influence their colleagues’ recusal decisions.49 The 
practical effect of this position is that even if explanations were 
statutorily required, the most likely outcome is that the Justices 
would seek to avoid providing any justification that could be seen as 
limiting a future recusal decision. Imagine statements like “Based on 
my review of the relevant facts and ethical standards, it is not 
necessary that I recuse myself from the case at hand.” This type of 
explanation does not inform or educate the public about the basis for 
a recusal decision, and is very hard to prohibit statutorily when the 
decision itself is unreviewable. 
A second potentially disturbing consequence is that if the Justices 
were inclined to explain their recusal decisions fully and candidly, 
the result could be increasing pressure from within the Court to be 
overly cautious in recusal cases. Consider two well-respected 
hypothetical Justices, both of whom take their ethical and 
institutional obligations quite seriously, and who have very different 
backgrounds and ideological reputations. A case arises involving an 
                                                                                                                 
 49. See, e.g., Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Do Appearances Matter? Judicial Impartiality and the Supreme 
Court in Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. REV. 606, 622 (2002) (noting that “the Justices encourage and protect 
a fiercely independent approach to their recusal determinations”). 
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employment dispute at a technology company in which a 
conservative Justice with a reputation for favoring business interests 
owns a life insurance policy that invests in small part in the tech 
industry. Concerned that the public will construe her indirect 
investments as biasing her in favor of the corporation, she recuses 
herself and explains as much in writing. A year later, a similar case 
confronts the Court, but this time a Justice with a reputation for being 
staunchly pro-employee has the same type of indirect investment in 
the corporate party. She is not inclined to recuse because she does not 
believe (quite reasonably) that anyone would perceive her life 
insurance policy as biasing her against the employees in the suit. 
Nevertheless, due to her colleague’s decision from the prior term, she 
feels as if failing to recuse will make her appear less ethical. She 
recuses herself and the Court is forced to decide the case with an 
even number of Justices, thus risking a tie vote and the possibility of 
the Court being unable to issue a binding, precedential opinion in the 
case, despite the fact that the recused Justice was completely capable 
of rendering a fair and impartial judgment in the suit. 
It may be that the above example does not seem terribly disturbing. 
After all, an ethical “race to the top” cannot be all bad. An exercise of 
caution in exchange for protecting the integrity and fairness of 
judicial proceedings makes sense. The problem arises when the 
institutional pressures to conform with or exceed the ethical criteria 
set by other Justices overcomes the ability to balance ethical and 
institutional interests as required by Article III. Even if the above 
hypothetical came out correctly, there is no doubt that valid 
institutional concerns about the Court’s ability to exercise its judicial 
power were potentially subjugated in an effort to appear as ethical as 
the other Justices, even when the circumstances of the two cases were 
meaningfully different. This is true even if both Justices feel fully 
competent to explain their participation without causing undue 
confusion. No matter how compelling the reasoning, a decision to 
participate in a case that is at odds with another Justice’s decision to 
recuse in an earlier case will inevitably be met with suspicion. It is 
not at all unreasonable to think that Justices faced with that dilemma 
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would prefer to remain above even the imagined ethical fray. For this 
reason, the Justices have consistently and vehemently defended their 
independence over recusal matters, even with regard to one another.50 
Justice Anthony Kennedy made the point recently when he testified 
before Congress that he believes the Justices’ recusal decisions 
“should never be discussed,” even with other members of the Court, 
because “[t]hat’s almost like lobbying.”51 His answer echoed the 
statements of several of his colleagues, who have explained that they 
do not like to reveal the reasons for their recusal decisions because 
they do not want the other Justices to feel pressure to recuse in the 
same situation.52 
A final concern about individual Justices setting recusal precedent 
is the opportunity it could create for opportunistic recusal motions 
from parties seeking to influence the composition of the Court. 
Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer testified before Congress 
regarding their concerns about such motions.53 Written explanations 
for recusal decisions could incentivize parties to attempt to recuse 
ostensibly unsympathetic Justices from their case. This could unfairly 
damage the Court’s public reputation and could raise significant 
administrative problems, as Justices will be required to spend 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to Senator Patrick Leahy, Jan. 26, 2004, 
reprinted in From the Bag: Irrecusable and Unconfirmable, 7 GREEN BAG 2D 277, 280 (2004). Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist responded to a letter from Senators Patrick Leahy and Joseph Lieberman 
arguing that Justice Antonin Scalia should have recused himself from a case in which he had gone duck-
hunting just prior to the case with a named party, Vice President Dick Cheney. The case was Cheney v. 
United States District Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004). The case was important due to the high-profile 
people involved and because it marked one of the very few instances in which a Supreme Court justices 
voluntarily revealed their reasons behind a decision not to recuse. In his letter to the senators, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist reminded them “it has long been settled that each Justice must decide such a question 
for himself.” Letter from Rehnquist to Leahy, supra. Perhaps most importantly, he defended Justice 
Scalia’s decision on the grounds that there is “no precedent” for recusal in such a case, and that “any 
suggestion by you [Senator Leahy] or Senator Lieberman as to why a Justice should recuse himself in a 
pending case is ill considered.” Id. at 280. 
 51. The United States House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, Budget Hearing-The 
Supreme Court of the United States, HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE (Mar. 23, 2015), 
http://appropriations.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=394064. 
 52. Steven Lubet & Clare Diegel, Stonewalling, Leaks, and Counter-Leaks: SCOTUS Ethics in the 
Wake of NFIB v. Sebelius, 47 VAL. U.L. REV. 883, 893 (2013). 
 53. Considering the Role of Judges Under the Constitution of the United States: Hearings Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 28 (2011). 
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valuable time and energy responding to such opportunistic recusal 
motions. 
Outside of the recusal-as-precedent context, requiring Justices to 
explain their recusal decisions raises further complications that must 
be weighed against the benefits of increased transparency generally. 
As an initial matter, such reforms are unenforceable against the 
Justices and thus incentivize Justices who do not wish to reveal their 
reasons to offer the same type of generalized, cursory statements that 
are designed to prevent their explanations from becoming 
precedential. Moreover, whatever benefit may be generated by the 
Justices disclosing the reasons for their recusal decisions, much of 
that benefit is lost in the absence of parallel substantive standards. If 
a Justice is unrestrained by Congress in deciding when to recuse 
herself, as I contend the Constitution requires, it is unlikely that  the 
procedural framework in which that decision was made will do much 
to alter it. Published reasons for failing to recuse will not, in the 
absence of defined criteria for recusal, promote public confidence 
in the integrity of the Court because there will be no baseline 
against which to measure the quality of the Justices’ explanations.54 
One counter argument to this point about procedural requirements 
being effectively hollow without corresponding substantive 
guidelines is that a public account of a Justice’s recusal decision 
could be used by the remaining members of the Court as a de facto 
record against which to review that decision. Using recusal 
explanations in this way would incentivize the Justices to be as 
thorough in their justifications as lower court judges, and would 
enable their colleagues on the Court to conduct a meaningful review 
of their decision. There have been numerous calls for appellate-style 
review of the Justices’ recusal decisions by the remainder of the 
Court, and the idea has some intuitive appeal.55 When looked at more 
closely, however, internal review of a Justice’s recusal decision is 
rife with legal and logistical problems that make it, and in turn any 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Virelli, The (Un)Constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal Standards, supra note 23, at 1224. 
 55. See, e.g., The Supreme Court Transparency and Disclosure Act of 2011, H.R. 862, 112th Cong., 
1st Sess. § 3(a)–(b) (2011), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h112-862; Jeffrey W. 
Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 644 (1987). 
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argument for transparency based on it, untenable. Legally, it is 
unlikely that some subset of the Justices could review the work of 
one of their own without running afoul of Article III’s “one supreme 
Court” requirement.56 Throughout the overwhelming majority of its 
history, the Supreme Court has acted as a singular unit.57 It has not 
been divided into panels like the circuit courts, and, as Chief Justice 
John Roberts pointed out in his 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal 
Judiciary, it would be unprecedented to allow members of the Court 
to review a Justice’s recusal decision.58 
As a practical matter, it is unlikely that the Justices would agree to 
review one another’s decisions, and even if they did so it is almost 
certain they would arrive at summary affirmances in every case. The 
Court has consistently held the view that recusal is an independent 
inquiry for each individual Justice.59 The Justices have supported that 
stance by refraining from engaging in any public exchanges about 
one another’s recusal decisions, save for one instance in which 
Justice Robert Jackson publicly suggested that Justice Hugo Black 
should have recused himself from the case of Jewell Ridge Coal 
Corporation v. United Mine Workers of America.60 Justice Jackson’s 
comments not only proved damaging to his own reputation, but also 
drew enough negative attention to the Court that it caused concern 
among the Justices about its effect on the integrity of the institution.61 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, An Open Discussion with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1033, 
1039 (2004). 
 57. Ross E. Davies, The Reluctant Recusants: Two Parables of Supreme Judicial Disqualification, 
10 GREEN BAG 2D 79, 92 (2006). 
 58. JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 8 (2011), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endreport.pdf (“A court normally does not 
sit in judgment of one of its own members’ recusal decision in the course of deciding a case.”). Federal 
judges may voluntarily submit their decisions for review by their peers on the court, but no court at any 
level of the federal judiciary reviews the recusal decisions of its own members. In re United States, 158 
F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998). Some states such as Alaska, California, Michigan, Oklahoma, and Texas 
have adopted procedures whereby a judge’s decision not to recuse may be reviewed by the other 
members of the same court. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 22.20.020(c) (West 2012); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 
170.3(c)(5) (West 2012); MICH. CT. R. 2.003(D)(3)(b) (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, Ch. 2, 
App. R. 15(b) (West 2012); TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(f)-(g) (West 2012). 
 59. See ROBERTS, supra note 58, at 7–8. 
 60. Jewel Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers of America, 325 U.S. 161 
(1945). 
 61. Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Black-Jackson Feud, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 203, 221 (“Washington 
was, of course, thunderstruck by Jackson’s blast. Newspaper columnists attacked both justices, although 
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In the seventy years since the Jewell Ridge incident, the Justices have 
spoken only rarely about their recusal practices, and in every instance 
have come out in support of their individual autonomy in recusal 
matters.62 
Even if the Justices were inclined to try and review one another’s 
recusal decisions, the logistics of that review may prove too difficult. 
As an initial matter, the Justices and the Court as a whole are poorly 
equipped to develop a factual record needed for meaningful review. 
As Professor Stempel explained, “[t]he Court . . . lacks any formal 
rule, mechanism, or custom of permitting fact development in aid of 
a recusal motion.”63 The unitary nature of the Court creates 
additional problems. Imagine an instance where two or more Justices 
faced recusal issues. How should the remaining members of the 
Court be allocated to review those recusal decisions? Should all eight 
of the remaining Justices review each recusal question, such that 
some Justices facing recusal themselves are voting on the fitness of 
their colleagues to participate in the same case? At what point does it 
seem too self-serving for one Justice facing recusal to be deciding on 
the potential participation of a colleague whom they may suspect 
would cast a vote different from their own? More generally, even if 
we assume (and there is no reason not to) that the Justices would only 
act in good faith, the mere appearance of any of the Justices voting to 
determine the composition of the Court in a specific case invites 
skepticism that could be damaging to the Court’s reputation and, in 
turn, legitimacy. 
Finally, requiring the Justices to provide written explanations of 
their recusal decisions adds additional work that could have serious 
administrative costs for the Court. It is not hard to envision multiple 
Justices being required to publish recusal decisions in nearly every 
case, at considerable cost in judicial time and money and at the 
expense of their work on merits cases. When compared to the limited 
                                                                                                                 
Jackson took most of the fire.”). 
 62. Ifill, supra note 49, at 622 (observing that “the Justices encourage and protect a fiercely 
independent approach to their recusal determinations”). 
 63. Stempel, supra note 55, at 642. 
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benefits of published recusal decisions, this alone is a powerful 
argument against increased transparency in the recusal context. 
The multifaceted nature of recusal at the Court makes it more akin 
to executive policymaking than traditional adjudication. The result is 
that it forces us to reexamine the Justices’ recusal practices—
especially the lack of transparency in those practices—in a new light. 
Perhaps surprisingly, a more policy-oriented look at Supreme Court 
recusal offers several powerful arguments against increased 
transparency that may otherwise not be obvious at first glance. 
CONCLUSION 
Transparency is undoubtedly an important principle in a 
democratic government. It is not, however, necessarily a one-size-
fits-all proposition. This holds true for issues of transparency at the 
Supreme Court. Whereas the Court’s traditional adjudicative 
responsibilities fit comfortably within norms of transparent decision 
making like publishing written opinions in merits cases, some of its 
other, more policy-oriented roles do not. This short paper considers 
two areas in which the Court’s activities more closely resemble 
policy judgments than traditional adjudication—certiorari and 
recusal—and uses them as examples of how the nature of the Court’s 
activity can impact the value of transparency in that activity. It does 
not seek to prove that transparency is per se less valuable in certiorari 
and recusal decisions, but rather to highlight the highly discretionary 
nature of those decisions and to propose that granting such a high 
degree of latitude to the Court also triggers some of the protections, 
like the deliberative process privilege, that are more commonly 
associated with policymaking by administrative agencies. The result 
is a call for a more context-based dialogue about transparency at the 
Court in hopes of promoting both our democratic values and the 
legitimacy of one of our most important institutions. 
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